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§ 13001................................................................ 14

INTRODUCTION
This appeal raises a straightforward but important legal
question: Do Petitioners allege sufficient facts to state a claim for
declaratory and mandate relief based on allegations that
Respondent water boards have a pattern and practice of shirking
their legal duties to implement mandatory agricultural pollution
control measures? The case authorities discussed below compel
the conclusion that Petitioners adequately allege such a pattern
and practice claim.
demurrer. Petitioners allege that Respondent water boards have
failed for many decades to protect California’s dwindling drinking
water supplies by repeatedly ignoring two independent legal
duties: one arising from a state regulation that applies to
agricultural pollution, which this Court has held is mandatory in
Monterey Coastkeeper v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 28 Cal.
App. 5th 342 (2018) and another arising from the State’s
affirmative duty under the public trust doctrine to protect water
resources, as defined in National Audubon Soc’y v. Superior
Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419 (1983). Because Petitioners First Amended
Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint (“FAC”) alleges that
Respondents have systematically ignored these legal duties, the
demurrer should have been overruled.

11

Document received by the CA 3rd District Court of Appeal.

Petitioners thus seek reversal of the trial court’s order on

The trial court offered three reasons for dismissing
Petitioners’ claims: (1) the claims do not state an actual
controversy and are not amenable to specific relief; (2) providing
a judgment would require review of complex discretionary
decisions; and (3) relief is not available when fulfilling a
mandatory duty that entails the exercise of discretion. Each of
these grounds constitutes reversible error.
First, the courts have expressly held that a program-wide
practice of ignoring governing laws, which Petitioners allege has
declaratory relief action. Such actions are justiciable and state
an active controversy.
Second, where the existence of an illegal pattern is alleged,
the trial court cannot sustain a demurrer on the basis that the
court would have to review each discretionary decision to discern
a pattern. Such allegations are accepted as true on demurrer.
Courts have already reviewed numerous successive individual
administrative records and determined that Respondent water
boards’ decisions failed to follow the law. That is, Petitioners
properly alleged claims for declaratory relief and traditional
mandate under CCP section 1085, separate from any CCP section
1094.5 action challenging each illegal permit.
Third, where agencies exercise discretion in fulfilling a
mandatory or ministerial duty, mandamus relief is available, so
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occurred over decades here, is properly the subject of a

long as courts do not require agencies to exercise discretion in a
particular way. When courts enforce a mandatory duty, they do
not thereby substitute their policy judgments for those of the
agency; relief ordered ensures that citizens can seek redress for
an agency’s abdication of its legal duty by failing to act.
This Court should thus reverse the dismissal. In the
alternative, the trial court should be directed to grant Petitioners
leave to amend. Otherwise, the agencies primarily responsible
for water quality would have no accountability for specific
repeated judicial mandates issued under CCP section 1094.5
against Respondents.
LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I.

The Water Boards’ Mandatory Duties Under the
Porter-Cologne Act and the Common Law Public
Trust Doctrine
A.

The Porter-Cologne Act

The Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act (the “PorterCologne Act”) regulates all discharges that “could affect” water
quality, including agricultural discharges. See Cal. Water Code
§ 13260. 1 In adopting the Porter-Cologne Act, the California
All statutory references here are to the Water Code unless
otherwise indicated.

1
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mandatory duties set forth in foundational water law, despite

Legislature found that “the people of the state have a primary
interest in the conservation, control, and utilization of the water
resources of the state, and that the quality of all the waters of the
state shall be protected for use and enjoyment by the people of
the state.” § 13000. Activities that may affect the State’s water
quality thus must be “regulated to attain the highest water
quality which is reasonable.” Id. This obligation attaches to both
groundwater and surface water. §§ 13001, 13050(e).
Respondent water boards are the “principal” state agencies
quality. §§ 13001, 13223. Namely, these Respondents
(collectively, “Water Boards”) are the State Water Resources
Control Board (“State Board”), the Central Coast Regional Water
Quality Control Board (“Central Coast Regional Board”), and the
Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board (“Central
Valley Regional Board”). The State Board sets policy. See
§ 13140. The regional boards formulate water quality
management plans, referred to as “basin plans,” that must
conform to the State Board policies. § 13240. Basin plans
identify “beneficial uses” of the waters such as for drinking water
supply, fishing, agricultural supply, and ecological functions.
§ 13050(f). All beneficial uses must be protected. § 13241.
To meet basin plan water quality objectives, regional
boards regulate the discharge of waste primarily through the
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with “primary responsibility” for controlling the State’s water

imposition of conditions and prohibitions on dischargers. These
conditions and prohibitions are contained in permits known as
“waste discharge requirements” or in “conditional waivers” of
waste discharge requirements. §§ 13243, 13263, 13269. A
“general” permit in lieu of individual permits may regulate a
class of similar dischargers. Id. §§ 13263, 13269. All permits
must be designed to achieve water quality standards. §§ 13260,
13263, 13269 & 13240. Such standards encompass water quality
objectives and beneficial use designations established in basin
In this action, Petitioners challenge the Water Boards’
issuance of illegal general permits governing agricultural
polluters in the Central Valley and Central Coast.
B.

The Nonpoint Source Regulations Adopted in
Response to Legislative Mandates

Increasingly concerned about water quality degradation
even thirty years after the enactment of the Porter-Cologne Act,
the Legislature has amended the Water Code to require the
Water Boards to control nonpoint source pollution. Nonpoint
sources of pollution include polluted runoff “moving over and
through the ground, and includes excess fertilizers, herbicides,
and insecticides from agricultural lands,” City of Arcadia v. State
Water Res. Control Bd., 135 Cal. App. 4th1392, 1403 (2006), as
distinct from discharges from industrial outfalls and pipes.
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plans. Petitioners’ Appendix (“App.”) 2:291.

In 1999, the Legislature amended the Water Code to
impose a mandatory duty on the State Board to “prepare” and
“implement” a “nonpoint source management plan.” See former
§ 13269(a) & (b)(2) (adopted by Stats. 1999, ch. 560 (S.B. 227),
§ 1, and renumbered by Stats. 2012, ch. 728 (S.B. 71), § 182, and
now codified at § 13369b)(2)).
In “connection with [such] duties,” the State Board was
mandated to “develop, on or before February 1, 2001, guidance
. . . for the purpose of describing the process by which the [Water
plan.” See former § 13369(a)(2)(B) (adopted by Stats. 1999, ch.
560 (S.B. 227), § 1) (renumbered by Stats. 2012, ch. 728 (S.B. 71),
§ 182, and now codified at Water Code § 13369 (b)(2)). In 2004,
under this mandate, the State Board adopted the Policy for
Implementation and Enforcement of the Nonpoint Source
Pollution Control Program (the “NPS Regulations”). App. 2:289.
As a water quality policy required by Water Code section
13369(b)(2), and approved by the Office of Administrative Law,
the NPS Regulations have the force and effect of law as a
regulation. See WaterKeepers N. Cal. v. State Water Res. Control
Bd., 102 Cal. App. 4th 1448, 1452 (2002); Monterey Coastkeeper,
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Boards] will enforce the state’s nonpoint source management

28 Cal. App. 5th at 349. 2
The NPS Regulations require that nonpoint source
pollution control permits include five mandatory “Key Elements.”
Monterey Coastkeeper, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 349; App. 2:299. These
Key Elements are intended to achieve the Water Code’s ultimate
objective of attaining and maintaining water quality. Thus,
permits shall:
Key Element 1: Address the pollution in a manner that
achieves water quality objectives and beneficial uses, including
Key Element 2: Describe management practices and
program elements to be implemented to ensure a high likelihood
that the program will attain water quality requirements.
Key Element 3: Set quantifiable milestones and
corresponding specific deadlines that measure progress towards
achieving water quality objectives.
Key Element 4: Provide sufficient feedback mechanisms to
ensure that the public can determine whether an implementation
program is achieving its stated purpose.
The Nonpoint Source Policy is referred to herein as the NPS
Regulations not only because it is a regulation under state law,
but also because of the potential for confusion in discussing
pattern and practice cases. Such cases often refer to an agency’s
“policy” of violating laws, when referring to the agency’s pattern
of illegal practice or unwritten policy of not adhering to a law.

2

17

Document received by the CA 3rd District Court of Appeal.

any applicable antidegradation requirements.

Key Element 5: Identify potential consequences for failure
to achieve the program’s stated purpose.
App. 2:299-303.
The antidegradation requirements referred to in Key
Element 1 of the NPS Regulations (“Antidegradation
Regulations”) are intended to protect high quality surface and
ground waters from degradation. Asociacion de Gente Unida por
el Agua v. Central Valley Water Quality Control Bd., 210 Cal.
App. 4th 1255, 1259 (2012) (“AGUA”).
The Public Trust Doctrine

In addition to statutory obligations, the State Board has a
fiduciary obligation to preserve and protect for current and future
generations the State’s surface and groundwaters that are
hydrologically connected to such surface waters. See Envtl. Law
Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 26 Cal. App. 5th 844, 85960 (2018). The law is plain: If an agency’s action might harm a
public trust resource, then the agency has the “affirmative duty
to take the public trust into account in the planning and
allocation of trust resources, and to protect public trust uses
whenever feasible.” San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. State Lands
Com., 242 Cal. App. 4th 202, 234 (2015) (quoting Nat’l Audubon
Soc’y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 446 (1983)). “Any action
which will adversely affect” a trust resource shall “be made only
if there has been full consideration of the state’s public interest in
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C.

the matter.” San Francisco Baykeeper, 242 Cal. App. 4th at 234
(quoting Zack’s, Inc. v. City of Sausalito, 165 Cal. App. 4th 1163,
1188-89 (2008)).
II.

Irrigated Agriculture Causes the Most Serious
Threat to Public Health and Ecological Resources in
the Central Valley and the Central Coast
Agricultural water pollution has harmed public health and

ecological resources across California. FAC ¶¶ 57-64. 3 That is
particularly true in the Central Valley and Central Coast regions
¶¶ 60-61. Irrigation not only provides water necessary for
croplands but also carries pollutants as runoff flows into creeks,
rivers, and the ocean, and percolates into groundwater. Id.
The Water Boards, which are primarily responsible for
regulating this runoff, have undisputedly identified pollution
from irrigated agriculture as the primary source of ongoing water
pollution including as “contaminated irrigation runoff and
percolation to groundwater causing widespread toxicity, unsafe
levels of nitrate, unsafe levels of pesticides, and excessive
sediment in surface waters and/or groundwaters.” Monterey
Coastkeeper, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 352 (reciting the Central Coast
Regional Board staff assessment).
3

Petitioners’ FAC is in the record at App. 1:128-172.

19

Document received by the CA 3rd District Court of Appeal.

where croplands depend on groundwater for irrigation. FAC

As a result – and as Petitioners allege – hundreds of
thousands of California residents in rural communities currently
lack clean, safe water for drinking and bathing. FAC ¶¶ 1, 9, 19,
60-67, 75-80, 88, 95. Without change, millions more will likely be
without drinkable water by 2050. See FAC ¶ 1, 62. At the same
time, pesticides from agricultural operations have impaired
thousands of surface water bodies, rendering them toxic to fish
and other aquatic life and threatening the state’s exceptional

III.

The Water Boards’ Continuing Failure to Meet Legal
Requirements Has Required Repeated Writ Petitions
to the Courts.
For over fifty years, the Water Boards have not complied

with their basic legal duties to regulate discharges from irrigated
agriculture. Instead, they have repeatedly tried measures that
are known to fail: outreach, education, and voluntary pollution
controls expected of growers. FAC ¶¶ 84, 89; see also Monterey
Coastkeeper, 28 Cal. App. 5th 342, 351-52 (describing the Central
Coast region’s 2004 permit); San Joaquin Res. Conservation Dist.
v. Cal. Regional Water Quality Control Bd., Case No. 34-201280001186 (Sac Sup. Ct. May 21, 2013) [“CSPA”] at 6-8 (describing
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biodiversity. FAC ¶¶ 13, 66.

inadequacies of the Central Valley region’s 2006 permit, which
was renewed in 2011) [App. 1:188-190]. 4
In response to the Water Boards’ failures, citizens groups
have been forced to challenge each successive irrigated
agricultural permit that did not include the mandatory elements
of the NPS Regulations. FAC ¶¶ 85-87; see also Monterey
Coastkeeper, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 368.
The Central Valley Regional Board’s Pattern
and Practice of Refusing to Comply with the
NPS Regulations

In the Central Valley, where seven million acres of
irrigated cropland account for three quarters of agricultural
activities in the State, FAC ¶ 88, Petitioners allege the Central
Valley Regional Board has repeatedly issued agricultural
discharge permits that do not comply with its basic duties under
the NPS Regulations. As a result, citizens have had to file
numerous petitions for administrative writs to require the
Central Valley Regional Board to correct the permits. FAC
San Joaquin Resource Conservation District’s case was
consolidated with California Sportfishing Protection Alliance v.
Cal. Regional Water Quality Control Board, Case No.
RG12632180, because both cases challenged the Central Valley
Regional Board’s renewal of an earlier permit. California
Sportsfishing Protection Alliance or CSPA is one of the
Petitioners here. The consolidated cases are referred to in this
brief as CSPA because the FAC does so.

4
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A.

¶¶ 85-122; see also AGUA, 210 Cal. App. 4th at 1258, 1286; CSPA
at 4, 20 [App. 1:186, 202]. Petitioners’ allegations in the FAC,
which must be taken as true on demurrer, explain in detail the
Central Valley Regional Board’s pattern and practice of
unlawfully refusing to address agricultural water pollution.
Specifically:
•

1982 Permit: The Central Valley region’s 1982 permit

largely exempted agricultural operations, with no mention of the
Antidegradation Regulations, which were in effect at that time.
•

2003 Permit: The next permit was issued in 2003, in

response to the tightened Water Code section 13269 and petitions
from environmental groups concerned about the 1982 exemption
of agricultural operations. FAC ¶ 90. The 2003 permit,
characterized as the Irrigated Lands Regulatory Program, relied
on monitoring, education, watershed plans and outreach – with
no controls at the source of the pollution. App. 1:186. The trial
court in CSPA held that this permit was inconsistent with the
Antidegradation Regulations. App. 1:2020.
•

Renewal of the 2003 Permit: In 2006, the 2003

permit was renewed without any further analysis under the new
NPS Regulations adopted in 2004. FAC ¶ 92. Citizens were
again forced to sue, challenging the renewal; the stipulated
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FAC ¶ 89.

judgment in the case set a deadline of 2011 for the establishment
of the Irrigated Lands Regulatory Program. App. 1:186.
•

Renewal of the 2006 Permit: In 2011, the illegal 2006

permit was renewed for another two years in contravention of the
court-ordered 2011 deadline for adoption of the permanent
Irrigated Lands Regulatory Program. FAC ¶ 96; App. 1:186. The
Sacramento Superior Court concluded that this permit did not
comply with NPS and Antidegradation Regulations. App. 1:201203. The court ordered the Central Valley Regional Board to
compliance with the State’s Antidegradation . . . and Nonpoint
Source [Regulations].” App. 1:204.
•

The Dairy Permit’s Failure to Comply with

Antidegradation Regulations: In 2012, a lawsuit contesting the
Central Valley permit governing pollution from dairies was
adjudicated; this Court held that the dairy permit failed to
comply with the Antidegradation Regulations, emphasizing their
importance to state water quality. AGUA, 210 Cal. App. 4th at
1258, 1286.
•

The Eastern San Joaquin Permit: In 2012, a permit

for the Eastern San Joaquin watershed was issued. FAC ¶ 102.
This 2012 permit, upon appeal, changed multiple times until a
final version was issued in 2018. FAC ¶¶ 103-122. Petitioners
allege that the 2018 Eastern San Joaquin permit also does not
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“bring its long-term Irrigated Lands Regulatory Program into

comply with the Nonpoint Source and Antidegradation
Regulations. FAC ¶128.
•

The Public Trust Doctrine: No Central Valley

agricultural permit has even considered the public trust doctrine,
as required by California law. See FAC ¶ 57-122, 150.
B.

The Central Coast Regional Board’s Pattern
and Practice of Refusing to Comply with Its
Duty to Regulate Agricultural Discharges

Similar to the Central Valley Regional Board’s
allege that the Central Coast Regional Board has a pattern and
practice of failing to comply with its mandatory duties. In the
435,000 acres that make up the Central Coast region, every
permit issued since 1983 has failed to comply with the NPS and
Antidegradation Regulations. These failures are detailed in
Petitioners’ FAC (¶¶ 84-87), as well as numerous rulings by
California courts finding the Water Boards’ actions unlawful. See
Monterey Coastkeeper v. State Water Res. Control Bd., Case No.
34-2012-80001324 (Sac. Super. Ct., May 15, 2015) at 32-33, 38
[App. 1:238-239, 244]; Monterey Coastkeeper, 28 Cal. App. 5th at
367, 370; Zamora v. Central Coast Regional Water Quality
Control Bd., Case No. 15CV-0247, 2016 WL 7163991 (San Luis
Obispo Super. Ct., Oct. 28, 2016). As with the Central Valley
Regional Board, no agricultural pollution program in the Central
Coast has considered the public trust doctrine. FAC ¶ 150.
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recalcitrance in the face of California’s water crisis, Petitioners

In sum, Petitioners allege that the Water Boards have
abdicated mandatory legal duties specified in the NPS
Regulations and the public trust doctrine in regulating
agricultural discharges. They will continue to do so, Petitioners
further allege, absent court intervention.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioners are a diverse group of environmental groups
concerned about access to safe drinking water, public health, and
ecological impacts of irrigated agriculture. The group includes
1094.5 to many of the illegal permits described above.
On August 3, 2017, to minimize repeated, time-consuming,
and resource-intensive court challenges, Petitioners filed a
complaint targeted at ending the Water Boards’ illegal practices.
This original complaint sought declaratory relief and a writ of
mandate under CCP section 1085. It also alleged CCP section
1094.5 claims concerning the latest permits governing the
Central Coast and the Central Valley – the 2017 Central Coast
permit and the 2018 Eastern San Joaquin permit. App. 1:009011.
On October 23, 2017, the State Board demurred to the
Second Cause of Action – which sought declaratory and
injunctive relief regarding the Water Boards failure to comply
with the NPS Regulations – on the ground that Petitioners could
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those who have filed successful challenges under CCP section

not state a claim for declaratory relief on the basis that there was
“no actual, concrete, ripe controversy.” App. 1:057. The State
Board also demurred to the same cause of action on the ground
that Petitioners could not state a claim for a CCP section 1085
mandate without identifying a “ministerial duty.” Id.
On February 23, 2018, the trial court sustained the
demurrer after a hearing. The trial court ruled that “it would be
both improper and impractical for the court to attempt to
undertake such a broad, open-ended review of the Board’s
At the hearing, the court expressed concern that it “almost
seems like meaningless relief” to declare the agencies are “not
doing their job, so do your job.” Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) 6:12, 6:10-11. The court then provided guidance for amending the
complaint: “If your cause of action said ‘They’re not following the
Nonpoint Source Policy,’ that seems to bring you more in line
with the cases you cite, . . . the East Bay MUD and the
Californians for Salmon. And you say there’s one discreet [sic]
thing, and then maybe we can, as you say, okay, set timelines, set
compliance.” Id. at 7:11-18.
Following this direction and leave to amend, on March 15,
2018, Petitioners filed the FAC. It focused the pattern and
practice claim on two specific and discrete legal duties. The new
Third Cause of Action alleges that the ongoing practice of
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discretionary decisions.” App. 1:125.

authorizing agricultural discharges that fail to comply with the
NPS Regulations is unlawful. FAC ¶¶ 132-147. For these
violations, Petitioners seek declaratory relief and a writ under
CCP section 1085. FAC ¶¶ 146-147. The Fourth Cause of Action
alleges that the State Board is engaged in ongoing violations of
its fiduciary duties under the public trust doctrine because it fails
to consider and avoid or minimize impacts to public trust
resources. FAC ¶¶ 148-151. For these violations, Petitioners
seek a writ under CCP section 1085. FAC ¶ 151.
amended claims. App. 1:254-255. As to the ongoing violations of
the NPS Regulations alleged in the Third Cause of Action, the
Water Boards demurred on the grounds that the declaratory
relief claim does not state a cause of action because (1) it does not
state an “actual, concrete, ripe controversy,” (2) the proper
challenge should be made to the administrative orders
“complained of” under CCP section 1094.5, rather than under
section 1085, and (3) the claim does not identify a “nondiscretionary, ministerial” duty. Id. As to the violation of the
public trust doctrine alleged in the Fourth Cause of Action, the
Water Boards demurred on the ground that the public trust
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The Water Boards brought a second demurrer to these

doctrine does not impose any “non-discretionary, ministerial”
duty on them. App. 1:254. 5
On May 11, 2018, the trial court held a hearing following a
tentative ruling issued the day before. App. 2:471. The tentative
ruling, without explanation as to the nature of the duties alleged,
stated that “Petitioners are asking the court to undertake a
broad, comprehensive review of all regional and state actions
relating to the regulation of agricultural dischargers.” App.
2:477. The court held that Petitioners do not allege an “actual
Respondents’ ongoing efforts to address nonpoint source pollution
and protect resources are not sufficiently ‘effective’ and
‘environmentally protective.’” App. 2:477-478. The court further
explained its view that mandate does not lie as to “a broad,
generalized challenge to an agency’s discretionary decisions” –
that mandate will lie “only if the act is performance of a
ministerial duty, or discretion to act legally can be exercised in
only one way.” App. 2:477.
During the hearing, in an effort to demonstrate facts that
could be added with leave to amend and to respond to the court’s
concern that the claims sought review of multiple individual
The Water Boards also demurred that declaratory relief was not
alleged properly as to the public trust doctrine. App. 1:263 at 6:614. But Petitioners made no such claim.

5
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controversy” because they “essentially seek a declaration that

administrative decisions, Petitioners informed the court that a
declaration could be filed, attesting that the successive permits in
the Central Valley and Central Coast regions are intentionally
designed, as a matter of unwritten policy or practice, to
circumvent the mandatory NPS Regulations. RT 20:27-22:10,
30:7-26. The trial court did not allow the filing of this
declaration. RT 33:20-33:9.
On May 29, 2018, an order was entered dismissing the
Third and Fourth Causes of Action based on the trial court’s
11, 2018 ruling incorporates the court’s February 23, 2018 ruling.
App. 1:121. Neither ruling contains an analysis of the
discretionary or mandatory nature of agency decisions.
On July 27, 2018, Petitioners filed a petition for expedited
review of the dismissal, before the remaining claim, the First
Cause of Action, was resolved. 7 See Petitioners’ Corrected
The same order disposed of the Second Cause of Action, which
challenged the 2018 Eastern San Joaquin permit under CCP
section 1094.5. The dismissal is not at issue on this appeal
(although the Eastern San Joaquin permit is yet more evidence of
the Water Boards’ pattern); the claim was filed in a separate
action in the Sacramento Superior Court. Monterey Coastkeeper
v. Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Bd., Case No.
34-2018-80002853 (Sacramento Super. Ct. filed Mar. 28, 2018).

6

Because the First Cause of Action is a CCP 1094.5 challenge to
the Central Coast’s 2017 permit, which presented the same legal

7
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tentative ruling of May 11, 2018, which became final. 6 The May

Petition for Writ of Mandate (C087635 incorporated by reference)
[App. 1:007]. On August 24, 2018, this Court denied the petition
for expedited review. On September 18, 2018, Monterey
Coastkeeper was decided. See 28 Cal. App. 5th at 342.
On September 27, 2019, after a settlement conference, the
parties resolved the First Cause of Action through a Stipulated
Judgment Granting Writ of Mandate, disposing of all of the
claims in the action. App. 2:486-490.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Sustaining Demurrer to Petitioners’ Third and Fourth Causes of
Action, which was entered on May 29, 2018. This Order became
appealable when final judgment was entered on September 27,
2019, fully disposing of all of the causes of action. Petitioners
filed timely Notice of Appeal on November 22, 2019, within 60
days of final judgment. App. 2:493. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to CCP section 904.1(a).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from a judgment dismissing a claim after
sustaining a demurrer, the court first reviews the complaint “de
issues as the 2013 permit at issue in Monterey Coastkeeper, the
parties had agreed to hold the claim in abeyance pending a
decision in Monterey Coastkeeper.
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This appeal challenges the Superior Court’s Order

novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a
cause of action under any legal theory, such facts being assumed
true for this purpose,” or to determine whether the trial court
erred as a matter of law. Potocki v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 38
Cal. App. 5th 566, 569 (2019) (quoting Committee for Green
Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors, 48 Cal. 4th
32, 42 (2010)). In this review, the court gives the complaint “a
reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in
their context,” but “not assuming the truth of contentions,
Tulare, 41 Cal. 4th 859, 865 (2007).
The appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision to
sustain the demurrer without leave to amend for abuse of
discretion, deciding “whether there is a reasonable possibility
that the defect can be cured by amendment.” Id. “[I]f it can be,
the trial court has abused its discretion.” Id.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Erred in Sustaining the Demurrer
for Declaratory Relief by Requiring More Than
Allegations of the Water Boards’ Ongoing Failure to
Comply with the NPS Regulations.
Petitioners’ Third Cause of Action alleges sufficient facts to

state a claim for declaratory relief under CCP section 1060.
Petitioners are entitled to a declaratory judgment based on their
allegations of the Water Boards’ consistent and ongoing practice
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deductions or conclusions of law.” City of Dinuba v. City of

of failing to include the five mandatory Key Elements of the NPS
Regulations in agricultural permits regulating the Central Valley
and Central Coast regions. The trial court misconstrued the
nature of the duties under the NPS Regulations, which are
mandatory, not discretionary. As a result, the trial court
mistakenly concluded that declaratory relief ordering the Water
Boards to comply with the law they are violating would be futile.
Yet declaratory relief does exactly that: declare that an agency is
violating a law. It is error to sustain a demurrer when a claim
claim should be reversed.
A.

Petitioners’ Allegations that the Water Boards
Have Ignored Mandatory Duties State a Claim
for Declaratory Relief.

Section 1060 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
provides that any person “who desires a declaration . . . may, in
cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties
of the respective parties, bring an original action in the superior
court . . . for a declaration of his rights and duties.” CCP § 1060.
A declaratory relief claim is properly stated under CCP
section 1060 when a state agency has a de facto practice of
ignoring or violating legal duties it is entrusted to implement.
Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Auth., 23
Cal. App. 5th1040, 1046 (2018); K.G. v. Meredith, 204 Cal. App.
4th 164, 177 (2012) (declaratory relief action “is an appropriate
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has been stated. Therefore, dismissal of the declaratory relief

means of challenging an alleged ‘overarching’ policy or practice of
an agency”); Clovis Unified Dist. v. Chiang, 188 Cal. App. 4th
794, 808-09 (2010) [“Clovis”] (same).
In a case alleging a pattern and practice, a court cannot
sustain a demurrer for failing to state a claim when the
complaint alleges (1) “the nature of the duties imposed on [an
agency] by law”; and (2) the agency’s practice of ignoring the duty
or law. Californians for Native Salmon etc. Assn. v. Department
of Forestry, 221 Cal. App. 3d 1419 (1990) [“Native Salmon”].
requirements. Petitioners allege the Water Boards have a
mandatory legal duty to include the Key Elements of the NPS
Regulations in the agricultural permits for two specific regions –
the Central Valley and the Central Coast. FAC ¶¶ 7, 8, 38-40,
45, 47, 135-138. They further allege that the Water Boards have
for decades systematically ignored these ministerial duties
despite Petitioners’ numerous successful court challenges. FAC
¶¶ 81, 82, 86, 136, 140-141, 142. These allegations state a
present, actual, and existing controversy between Petitioners and
Respondents as to the legality of these failures, which should be
resolved by declaratory judgment.
Similar allegations have been deemed sufficient at the
demurrer stage; no more is required. See Venice Town Council,
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. App. 4th 1547, 1560, 1566
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Petitioners’ allegations meet the Native Salmon

(1996) (error to sustain a demurrer to a declaratory relief claim
alleging defendant has a “de facto” policy of “ignoring or
violating” a statute); Alameda Cty. Land Use Ass’n v. Hayward,
38 Cal. App. 4th 1716, 1722-23 (1995) (error to sustain demurrer
“when the complaint reveals” a dispute over “whether a public
entity has engaged in conduct or established policies in violation
of applicable law.”). Thus, Petitioners’ Third Cause of Action
sufficiently states a claim for declaratory relief.
The Trial Court Erred in Finding that
Petitioners’ Declaratory Relief Claim Does Not
Present a Specific and Concrete Controversy.

In sustaining the demurrer, the trial court found that
Petitioners do not allege an “actual controversy relating to the
legal rights and duties of the respective parties.” App. 2:477
(citing CCP § 1060). This ruling is error. It disregards precedent
such as Native Salmon, 221 Cal. App. 3d 1419, and misconstrues
the gravamen of Petitioners’ declaratory relief claim, the nature
of the Water Boards’ duty, and the justiciability of pattern and
practice claims.
1.

Petitioners’ case, alleging a pattern of
continuing noncompliance, presents an
actual controversy justiciable in the
courts.

The trial court erroneously concluded that Petitioners’
claim does not present an actual controversy. The trial court
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B.

opined that Petitioners “seek a general declaration that the State
Board simply ‘isn’t doing enough’” in connection with its
obligation to supervise regional boards in their regulation of
agricultural discharges, or that the Water Boards’ “ongoing
efforts to address nonpoint source pollution . . . are not
sufficiently ‘effective’ and ‘environmentally protective.’” App.
2:474, 478.
But Petitioners’ claim is not that the permits should be
more “effective”; rather, Petitioners allege that the Water Boards’
of the NPS Regulations. FAC at ¶ 8. Such claims are amenable
to declaratory relief because an actual controversy exists when an
agency entrusted with implementing a law has consistently failed
to do so, and judicial intervention is required to declare the
course of action illegal. See Clovis, 188 Cal. App. 4th at 808-09
(granting declaratory relief for State Controller’s “overarching”
policy of using unenforceable audit parameters); Venice Town
Council, 47 Cal. App. 4th at 1566 (error to sustain demurrer as to
city’s “de facto” policy); East Bay Mun. Utility Dist. v. Dep’t of
Forestry & Fire Prot., 43 Cal. App. 4th 1113, 1119 (1996).
Courts have explicitly recognized that a pattern and
practice case does not “merely express[ ] dissatisfaction” with the
individual administrative actions underlying the pattern. Native
Salmon, 221 Cal. App. 3d at 1428. Rather, when an agency
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conduct has been unlawful in failing to include the Key Elements

“refuses to act at all under a misconception of the duty imposed
upon [it] by law, the courts will correct the error” through
declaratory relief. Bess v. Park, 132 Cal. App. 2d 49, 55, (1955).
The primary case on which the trial court relied for its
ruling, Zetterberg v. State Dep’t of Public Health, 43 Cal. App. 3d
657 (1974), makes it plain that the trial court misconstrued the
nature of declaratory relief actions. See App. 2:478. Zetterberg
states the unremarkable rule that the controversy must be
actual: “the controversy must be of character which admits of
advisory opinion upon a particular or hypothetical state of facts.”
Id. at 661 (emphasis added).
Unlike in Zetterberg, Petitioners do not request “a general
declaration regarding the duties of an [agency]” untethered to a
particular controversy. See id. at 661. Rather, Petitioners allege
a pattern and practice of illegal conduct that can be remedied by
a judgment declaring the practice illegal. In this case, in contrast
to Zetterberg, the Legislature has already imposed the duty of
implementing the NPS Regulations on the Water Boards. This is
an actual controversy that can and should be resolved by
declaratory relief.
Moreover, Zetterberg was decided on summary judgment.
43 Cal. App. 3d at 660. Here, Petitioners have not yet had an
opportunity to develop their facts because the trial court
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specific and conclusive relief . . . as distinguished from an

sustained the demurrer and denied discovery. App. 2:479-80.
Even without discovery, Petitioners alleged the existence of a
pattern of illegal practice concerning a regulation that the parties
agree applies to the permits at issue here. With discovery,
Petitioners could have shown that the Water Boards’ policy was
purposeful based on their experience with agency staff. RT
20:27-22:10, 30:7-26. Although not required to state a claim, the
intentional nature of the practice makes declaratory relief an

2.

Petitioners’ claim is amenable to specific
and conclusive relief because the NPS
Regulations provide the legal standard.

The trial court similarly erred in ruling that the
controversy is not amenable to “specific and conclusive relief.”
App. 2:478. The court explained that it “must have ‘narrow,
precise questions’ that can be ‘tested against legal standards,’ so
that the court may decree, not suggest, what the parties may or
may not do.” Id. (quoting Zetterberg, 43 Cal. App. 3d at 664).
The trial court also relied on BKHN, Inc. v. Dep’t of Health
Servs., 3 Cal. App. 4th 301, 309-11 (1992), which similarly stands
for the unremarkable proposition that a claim must be ripe to be
adjudicated. App. 2:478. Here, ripeness was not at issue.
Furthermore, BKHN specifically recognized that Native Salmon
presented a contrasting situation from the one at issue there.
BKHN, 3 Cal. App. 4th at 311.

8
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especially important check on the executive branch. 8

Here, however, the mandatory NPS Regulations do provide
narrow and precise legal standards. The Water Boards are
directed to implement the NPS Regulations. Monterey
Coastkeeper, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 367. The court has the power to
declare that the Water Boards are failing to comply with the
mandatory NPS Regulations. See id. Thus, the court need not
“suggest” a remedy; it need only declare that the Water Boards
are violating the NSP Regulations.
The trial court erred by incorrectly
assuming that it was required to review
individual permit actions.

Petitioners’ declaratory relief claim is focused on the Water
Boards’ pattern of illegally ignoring the NPS Regulations
program-wide in issuing irrigated agriculture permits. This
claim is distinct from judicial actions challenging individual
permits, permit-by-permit, which are unquestionably CCP
section 1094.5 cases. See AGUA, 210 Cal. App. 4th at 1266;
Monterey Coastkeeper, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 356.
The trial court misapprehended the case as requiring a
“broad, comprehensive” judicial review of “all regional and state
actions relating to the regulation of agricultural discharges.”
App. 2:477. As explained above, the Native Salmon line of cases
recognizes declaratory relief claims alleging an illegal de facto
practice independent of any CCP section 1094.5 challenge to a
specific administrative decision. No broad or comprehensive
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3.

review is required where, as here, an agency’s illegal pattern and
practice as to a specific legal requirement – the NPS Regulations
– is challenged.
If the trial court were correct, Petitioners would be reduced
to playing whack-a-mole, challenging one permit at a time,
despite the existence of a pattern of illegal conduct. Although the
permits may be complicated, courts have held multiple times that
the Water Boards’ decisions failed to follow the NPS Regulations.
See FAC ¶¶ 85-105; Monterey Coastkeeper, 28 Cal. App. 5th 342,
[App. 1:186, 202]. The law is that when a plaintiff has alleged the
existence of an illegal pattern of conduct, the existence of the
pattern is accepted as true, and a demurrer cannot be sustained.
Native Salmon, 221 Cal. App. 3d at 1428 (“appellants’ allegations
of the [illegal] policies are deemed true by their demurrer”).
4.

The trial court erred by considering issues
other than the sufficiency of Petitioners’
allegations.

When a plaintiff has sufficiently pled a claim, a demurrer
cannot be sustained based on concerns the court may have about
the nature of the relief that may be granted. Serrano v. Priest, 5
Cal. 3d 584, 618-19 (1971) (reversing dismissal of declaratory
relief claim on demurrer and providing guidance on remedy to be
provided, should the claim be found meritorious on remand);
Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency, 108
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351-52; AGUA, 210 Cal. App. 4th at 1258, 1286; CSPA at 4, 20

Cal. App. 4th 1028, 1047 (2002) (error to sustain demurrer as “to
a particular type of damage or remedy”). Remedy issues are
irrelevant because the demurrer tests only the sufficiency of the
pleading. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 53 Cal.
4th 861, 872 (2012); Venice Town Council, 47 Cal. App. 4th at
1562.
Here, the trial court appears to have been motivated by its
concern about the futility of declaratory judgments in general, in
addition to the impact on the court of monitoring the remedy, if
THE COURT: But isn’t that the law? . . . “Okay,
State Board, do your job,” right? So if I issue that,
then what? . . . . [S]o it almost seems like
meaningless relief. I mean, by law, they’re supposed
to do their job.
RT 5:23-6:2. The trial court further speculated about what
may happen if Petitioners were to prevail:
I’m not going to be like Judge Henderson in the
Federal Court . . . that takes control of the prisons.
…
I’m not willing to step in and say I’m going to take
over the Department and oversee them and make
sure they do it right.
…
[After obtaining a declaratory judgment, Petitioners]
come back in two or three months and say, “Judge,
they’re not following the law, they’re not doing what
you told them to do.
RT 18:16-22, 19:16-18, 28:20-22.
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Petitioners were to win on the merits:

But declaratory judgments provide meaningful relief and
have done so in seminal public interest cases to address problems
such as school desegregation, school financing equity, and
legislative reappointment. Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 618-19. A
“declaratory judgment is a real judgment, not just a bit of
friendly advice.” Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775,
782 (7th Cir. 2010). Moreover, the trial court’s speculations
about what may happen upon entry of judgment are irrelevant at
the pleading stage. For all the trial court’s speculations, the
judgment.
II.

Petitioners State a Claim for Traditional Writ Relief
Based on the Water Boards’ Failure to Comply with
the NPS Regulations and the Public Trust Doctrine.
Petitioners’ Third cause of action states a claim under CCP

section 1085 to correct the Water Boards’ continuing illegal
practice of failing to comply with the NPS Regulations. The
Fourth Cause of Action, too, states a claim for a traditional writ
to correct the State Board’s utter failure of its duty to consider
the public trust doctrine. The trial court nevertheless sustained
the demurrer as to these claims. In doing so, the trial court failed
to recognize the Water Boards’ duties under the NPS Regulations
and the public trust doctrine as mandatory.
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Water Boards may in fact choose to fully comply with the

A.

Writ of Mandate Is Proper to Remedy the Water
Boards’ Pattern and Practice of Failing to
Perform Acts Required by Law.

A traditional writ of mandate “may be issued by any court
to any . . . board . . . to compel the performance of an act which
the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station.” CCP § 1085. Common Cause v. Bd. of Supervisors, 49
Cal. 3d 432, 442 (1989).
Like declaratory relief, a traditional writ under CCP
section 1085 is independent of redress in a pattern and practice
1094.5 may be available for case-specific remedies. Conlan v.
Bonta, 102 Cal. App. 4th 745, 752 (2002) (CCP § 1094.5 remedy
“does not preclude a broader challenge to agency conduct or
procedures alleged to breach the agency’s statutory obligations”
through CCP § 1085); Timmons v. McMahon, 235 Cal. App. 3d
512, 517 (1991) (CCP § 1085 proper vehicle to challenge a
“practice and policy” of denying eligibility for assistance based on
alleged erroneous interpretation of law).
Thus, a court cannot sustain a demurrer if the petition
pleads sufficient “ultimate facts to establish that the action”
petitioner seeks to compel under CCP section 1085 is “a legal
duty of the respondent, which it refuses to perform.” Pich v.
Lightbourne, 221 Cal. App. 4th 480, 490-91 (2013); Venice Town
Council, 47 Cal. App. 4th at 1558-61 (error to sustain demurrer
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case, even when an administrative mandate under CCP section

when plaintiffs alleged “de facto” illegal practice subject to a CCP
§ 1085 writ). 9
Here, Petitioners allege a violation of a clear regulatory
duty – the Water Boards failed to comply with the NPS
Regulations in numerous permits issued between 2004 and 2018
and will continue to do so, despite successful court decisions
under CCP section 1094.5 against the Water Boards. FAC ¶¶ 84122, 132-147. These allegations are sufficient to state a CCP

B.

Petitioners Allege Sufficient Facts for a Writ of
Mandate to Compel Compliance with the Public
Trust Doctrine.

Petitioners allege that the State Board has not performed a
public trust analysis in its permitting, and that this failure
violates the State Board’s public trust duties. FAC ¶¶ 148-51.
These allegations are well-grounded in the California Supreme
Court decision in National Audubon, which held that “[t]he state
has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in
Two other elements must be pled: that the petitioner has “a
beneficial interest in the outcome of the proceedings” and has “no
other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law.” Pich, 221 Cal.
App. 4th at 490-91. Petitioners pled facts as to these elements.
FAC ¶¶ 145, 147. These are not at issue on this appeal. Neither
Respondents’ demurrer nor the trial court ruling disputed that
the elements were pled.
9
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section 1085 writ claim.

the planning and allocation of water resources.” 33 Cal. 3d at
425, 446 (emphasis added). “Any action which will adversely
affect traditional public rights . . . should therefore be made only
if there has been full consideration of the state’s public interest in
the matter.” San Francisco Baykeeper, 242 Cal. App. 4th at 234.
Groundwater that is hydrologically connected to navigable
surface waters is also subject to public trust duties. Envtl. Law
Found., 26 Cal. App. 5th at 859-60. Contemporary public trust
uses include the “preservation of [trust] lands in their natural
study, as open space, and as environments which provide food
and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect
the scenery and climate of the area.” Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d
251, 259-60 (1971).
Importantly, the State Board’s public trust obligations
extend beyond individual permits to the entire program
governing irrigated agriculture. See Envtl. Law Found., 26 Cal.
App. 5th at 862. As with other legal duties, “[t]he proper means
to challenge the adequacy” of an agency’s compliance with the
public trust doctrine is through a petition for writ of mandate.
Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 166 Cal. App.
4th 1349, 1354 (2008); see also San Francisco Baykeeper, 242 Cal.
App. 4th at 210-11 (granting writ of mandate); National
Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d at 452-53 (same).
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state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific

Here, Petitioners allege the existence of the public trust
duty, the many public trust uses under threat, and the failure of
all of the many agricultural permits “to consider the impacts” of
the permits or the program on “public trust resources and failing
to protect and avoid or minimize harm to public trust resources to
the extent feasible.” FAC ¶¶ 124.c, 128.b; ¶¶ 54, 57, 66, 148-50.
For example, the 2018 Eastern San Joaquin permit from the
State Board confirms that the public trust doctrine “has not been
addressed.” FAC ¶ 120. Thus, Petitioners’ writ claim based on
upheld.
C.

The Trial Court Erred in Sustaining the
Demurrer as to the Writ Claims as They Do Not
Seek to Direct the Manner in Which Mandatory
Duties Are Satisfied.

The trial court concluded that the NPS Regulations and
Public Trust duties at issue here are not “ministerial dut[ies],”
where “discretion to act can be exercised in only one way.” App.
2:477. The trial court misapprehended the reach of CCP section
1085, concluding that the court cannot “control the manner in
which the agency will exercise its discretion in the future.” Id.
As this Court has held, however, “ministerial action or
mandatory duties to exercise discretion” are subject to a
traditional writ. Pich, 221 Cal. App. 4th at 490. Where an
agency “does not have a choice whether” to do a certain act, it is
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failure to consider the public trust doctrine should have been

mandatory even if there is discretion in implementing the duty.
Redwood Coast Watersheds All. v. State Bd. of Forestry & Fire
Prot., 70 Cal. App. 4th 962, 970 (1999). In Redwood Coast, the
court explained, “while [the Board] has a discretionary duty to
determine the content of the regulations . . . [t]he Board does not
have a choice whether to adopt such regulations: the [statute]
unqualifiedly requires it to adopt them.” Id.
Similarly, in Sanitation Agencies, the Court held that
traditional writ was proper to require a regional water board to
regional board had discretion in crafting the permit at issue. Cal.
Ass’n of Sanitation Agencies v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 208
Cal. App. 4th 1438, 1461-62 (2012). The Sanitation Agencies
court aptly observed that “issuing a traditional writ does not
mean the courts should or will become a kind of ‘Supervising
Board of Water Quality Control.’ . . . But if an agency is
categorically refusing to carry out its statutory and regulatory
obligations in the face of evidence that would require it to take
action, the law must provide a remedy.” Id. Here, the Water
Boards have discretion in crafting the permit program and the
permits but must do so in compliance with the mandatory Key
Elements.
As to the public trust doctrine, too, the writ sought here is
simply to require the State Board to take the public trust into
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comply with mandatory basin plan requirements even though the

account in the permits. As this Court pointed out in in
Environmental Law Foundation, if a writ is issued after trial
directing the State Board to consider the public trust, “[p]recisely
what that action would be is an issue that is left for another day.”
26 Cal. App. 5th at 870 n.2 (emphasis in original). The trial court
thus erred in finding that issuing a CCP section 1085 writ would
impermissibly infringe on agency discretion.
III.

The Trial Court Erroneously Denied Petitioners
Leave to Amend the Complaint.

may, in furtherance of justice . . . allow, upon any terms as may
be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding.” CCP
§ 473(a)(1). Unless the complaint, liberally construed, “shows on
its face that it is incapable of amendment, denial of leave to
amend constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Sheehan v. San
Francisco 49ers, Ltd., 45 Cal. 4th 992, 1003 (2009). A court
should only deny leave to amend if the complaint fails to state a
cause of action under any possible legal theory. Id. at 1003.
Petitioners allege sufficient facts concerning the violation of
the Water Boards’ mandatory duties. If this Court were to
determine, however, that Petitioners should have alleged
additional facts, Petitioners should be provided an opportunity to
do so in this public interest case.
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In deciding whether to grant leave to amend, “the court

CONCLUSION
Petitioners respectfully request that the Court reverse the
dismissal of the Third and Fourth Causes of Action in the First
Amended Complaint and direct the trial court to overrule the
demurrer. In the alternative, the Court should grant leave to
amend to enable Petitioners to allege any facts that are lacking to
state a claim in this meritorious case.
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